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ESSAY
THE INCOHERENCE OF MARITAL BENEFITS
ROBIN L. WESTt
INTRODUCTION
En route to finding the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Windsor v. United States' gave short
shrift to one of Congress's primary arguments in defense of the Act: that
the federal government has a compelling interest in limiting federal mar-
riage benefits to opposite-sex couples because traditional marriage has the
laudable purpose-or function-of channeling the heterosexual sex that
creates children into a way of life that provides the optimal environment for
the rearing of those children. 2 In other words, DOMA aims to minimize
irresponsible heterosexual sex and procreation, thereby limiting the number
of children born outside of marriage and minimizing the dependency of
single parents and their children on state assistance. As a number of
courts-whether state or federal, and whether operating under state or
federal constitutional guarantees3 -have done in reviewing DOMA, the
t Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
2 See id. at 187-88 (rejecting the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group's (BLAG) argument that
DOMA advances the goals of "responsible childrearing").
3 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Sers., 682 F.3d 1, 13-15 (1st Cir.
2012) (discussing and dismissing various justifications for DOMA); Golinski v. U.S. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 991-93 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing the "responsible pro-
creation and child-rearing" argument); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388
(D. Mass. 2010) ("readily dispos[ing]" of the responsible procreation argument); In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P-3d 384, 431-32 (Cal. 2008) (discussing and dismissing same); see also Litigating the
Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684,
(179)
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Second Circuit gave the "responsible procreation" argument only cursory
treatment. Essentially, the Second Circuit reasoned (no doubt, correctly)
that extending federal marriage benefits to all married couples-both same-
and opposite-sex-will not affect the incentives of heterosexual couples to
marry, and therefore should not threaten any state interest in encouraging
marriage among heterosexuals who, by force of desire or nature, may be
inclined to produce children as a result of their mutual lust.4 Finding no
state interest sufficiently compelling to justify what appears to be an
irrational classification, the court declared DOMA unconstitutional.5
The Supreme Court may or may not reach the substantive merits of
Windsor. But if it does, the responsible procreation argument warrants
greater attention, not because the Second Circuit's conclusion was wrong-
surely the state's interest in incentivizing the responsible procreation of
heterosexuals does not justify the discriminatory treatment of gays and
lesbians-but because the reason the argument fails is quite a bit weightier
than the Second Circuit's mechanical treatment of it suggests. The respon-
sible procreation theory fails not because it is bizarre or incoherent; it is
considerably more coherent, albeit dated, than either the Second Circuit or
traditional marriage's many critics seem willing to admit. Rather, it fails
because the argument behind it rests on premises that are no longer true-if
they ever were-and because the exclusions it suggests, however coherent,
are now simply cruel and unwarranted.
Just as importantly, although rarely noted by marriage equality's advo-
cates, the failure of the responsible procreation justification for the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marital benefits also suggests the irrationality of the
exclusion of other forms of family-and indeed, of single individuals -from
this form of federal largesse. In other words, the irrationality of the responsi-
ble procreation argument also highlights the irrationality-and cruelty-of
governmental preference for married persons across the board and, in turn, of
civil marriage altogether. I'll take up these points consecutively.
2699-2700 (2004) (arguing that the state's asserted interest in responsible procreation is "substan-
tially underinclusive"); Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an
Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 783 (2012) ("The roots of responsible procreation are
undoubtedly religious, and its presuppositions are in considerable tension with current social and
legal realities." (footnotes omitted)); Robert J. Pfister, Marriage Equality in Bankruptcy Court: Joint
Petitions Jor Same-Sex Couples, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 109, 112-15 (2012) (discussing the history behind
the Obama Administration's decision to stop defending DOMA's constitutionality).
4 See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188 (arguing that DOMA does not affect heterosexual couples'
incentives to enter marriage "in any way").
5 Id.
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I. THE CASE AGAINST RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION
The problem with the responsible procreation argument6 is not that it is
incoherent, as was argued by the Second Circuit and by numerous commen-
tators.7 There is nothing incoherent about a social policy that promotes
raising children in intact families headed by two married partners. After all,
the contention that children in such families fare better than their peers
who lack those advantages is supported by an abundance of social science.8
Nor is there any irrationality in encouraging those who want to engage in
the kind of opposite-sex sex that creates children to cabin their heterosexual
sexual activities within those marriages. This, however, presumes that their
sex leads to children, and that children raised in stable marriages are indeed
advantaged. It is similarly reasonable to use carrots as well as sticks to
encourage this form of social organization. In other words, to favor marriage
over both single parenthood and mere cohabitation by offering federal as
well as state benefits to the former, but not the latter, is completely con-
sistent with a state policy promoting childbearing within the context of
marriage. And such favoritism is far less punitive than earlier policies that
penalized "illegitimate" children both financially and legally,9 that encour-
aged the social stigmatization of unwed mothers (as was commonplace until
6 That is, the argument that the societal need to channel procreative sexuality into marital
forms, so as to ensure better outcomes for the children who result from that sex, justifies limiting
federal marital benefits to opposite-sex couples. See Nice, supra note 3, at 783 ("[T]he responsible-
procreation [argument] surmises that same-sex couples already procreate responsibly and that the
rights and responsibilities of marriage should be limited to furthering the goal of encouraging
more responsible procreation by heterosexuals.").
7 See, e.g., Jacob Combs, Analysis: The Prop 8 Plaintiffs Debunk the 'Responsible Procreation'
Argument jor Good, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Mar. 1, 2013, 10:26 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-combs/analysis-the-prop-8plain b_2783530.
html?utm hp-ref=gay-voices ("This type of 'reduction to the absurd' logic points out the central,
inescapable flaw in the Prop 8 proponents' reasoning: when you take the issue of sexual orienta-
tion out of the equation, it is fundamentally absurd to limit the institution of marriage only to
couples who can procreate.").
8 See, e.g., LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 124 (2000)
(reaching the conclusion that "[o]n average, children of married parents are physically and
mentally healthier, better educated, and later in life, enjoy more career success than children in
other family settings").
9 See For 'Unwed Fathers', Laws Are Changing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1972, at 68 (describ-
ing the various ways that illegitimate children were disfavored before the law, while claiming
that "[t]he legal relationship between the father of an illegitimate child and his offspring is
slowly being redefined").
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well into the 1970s),o or that either limited welfare payments to unmarried
parents or conditioned those payments on work assignments. In fact, we
still limit such welfare payments and have done so since the Clinton
Administration initiated the policy in the 1990s.1 2 And of course, under
current law, we continue to withhold from single and unmarried parents
various benefits that they would enjoy were they married.13 None of this is
incoherent. In fact, it all makes perfectly good sense if it is true that chil-
dren fare better in married households, and that heterosexual sex carries
with it a high risk of conception and procreation.
Nor is this argument as divorced from our current understanding of
marriage's purpose as its critics claim it to be. The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),14 first enacted
during the second Clinton Administration and renewed during the Bush
years, was explicitly aimed at bolstering precisely this understanding of
marriage. The entire point of that law, as stated explicitly in the law's
preamble, 5 was to reduce single mothers' dependency upon government,
and to encourage in its place dependency upon a husband wage earner in a
traditional marriage. Marriage was inscribed into that law as the necessary
moral precondition of child bearing and child rearing, and the host of eco-
nomic incentives and disincentives that the law created were all aimed at
engineering-or concretizing-that moral connection: if you want children,
then marry the children's father. If you have a child and don't marry the
child's father, then you have done something grossly irresponsible, so
don't turn to the government for assistance. PRWORA thus represented a
legalistic reinvigoration of a host of mid-century cultural norms and
10 See Sara McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Single Mothers, the Underclass, and Social Policy, 5o
ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 92, 99-100 (1989) (analyzing data from 1980, which
highlighted the increased social isolation that resulted from unwed motherhood).
1 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006))
(requiring that all parents receiving assistance under the program engage in work).
12 See id. § 401(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)) (citing as a
primary purpose of the Act, the reduction of needy parents' dependence on government benefits
through the promotion of marriage).
13 For instance, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires qualifying employers to
provide leave to employees in order to care for a legal spouse, but not for an unmarried partner.
See FMLA Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/
whd/fmla/fmla-faqs.htm#7 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (requiring, as a "[q]ualifying condition[]" of
the Act's benefits, that the individual cared for be a "spouse, child, or parent").
14 110 Stat. 2105.
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (citing, as a primary goal of the Act, "end[ing] the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage").
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practices that had begun to recede in the more "permissive" decades,
beginning with the 196os: the stigmatization of illegitimacy; the punitive
stance toward unwed mothers who were often forced into either life-
threatening back-alley abortions or pregnancies followed by coerced
adoptions; employment practices toward such mothers, which went some
distance toward ensuring a life of poverty; the more- than- symbolic laws
against fornication 6 and adultery;17 and the array of state laws establish-
ing a husband's paternity of children born during the time of the mar-
riage," DNA tests notwithstanding. All of these practices operated
jointly so as to channel procreative sexuality and the children that
resulted therefrom into the marital domain.
Of course, this identification of marriage as the only institution within
which procreative heterosexual sexual activity could safely-and hence
morally-occur, was a cultural identification; it was not founded upon a
dictionary definition and although it was both supported and enforced by
law, it was not itself inscribed in law. It was inscribed, however-and quite
firmly-in scores, if not hundreds, of social practices from that time period,
ranging from childhood ditties ("first comes love, then comes marriage,
then comes Susie with a baby carriage"), children's games of "house," and
prom night rituals, to tragi-farcical "shotgun marriages" as well as, most
centrally, conceptions of marital sex as a morally (and legally) obligatory
duty of wives and an entitlement of husbands, unhindered by conditions of
mutual consent, pleasure, or desire. "Irresponsible sex" then became, by
definition, heterosexual sex outside of marriage, while "responsible sex" was
sex within marriage, and a host of legal, as well as cultural, incentives and
disincentives directed such sex into the institution of marriage. Have the
critics and courts that find the procreative responsibility argument so
incoherent as not to be cognizable19 simply forgotten all of this?
16 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (West 2013); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
40 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2012).
17 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § '8-6-5o (West 2013);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (West 2012); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-35 (West); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 (West 2012).
18 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116, 132 (1989)(holding that a state statute creating
a rebuttable presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband establishes
the paternity of the husband does not violate principles of due process or equal protection).
19 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012)
(citing with approval other decisions, including Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., 682 F.3 d 1(1st Cir. 2012), and Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., C.A. No. 10-1750,
2012 WL 3113883 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012), which found that DOMA lacked any rational basis).
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The problem with the "responsible procreation" argument is therefore
not that it is incoherent. Rather, the problem is that the entire argument is
premised on the now-false claim that there exists a strong causal connection
between procreation and heterosexual sex. Since the invention, development,
and promulgation of near foolproof birth control, it is not heterosexual sex
that leads to procreation. Rather, it is uncontracepted heterosexual sex that
leads to procreation. Nor is heterosexual sex even a necessary condition of
genetic procreation, given the now commonplace usage of in vitro fertili-
zation (IVF), surrogate pregnancies, and adoptions by same-sex couples of
children genetically tied to one of the partners. Heterosexual sex, in other
words, is no longer either necessary to, or sufficient for, the conception of
children who are genetically connected to the parents who will raise them.
These technological advancements in reproductive methods have also
wrought changes in our moral understanding of sex. For most of us today,
"irresponsible" heterosexual sex is not sex that is outside of marriage.
Rather, it is heterosexual sex that is either unwanted or nonconsensual,
that inflicts personal harm or causes injustice,2 0 or, significantly, that is
uncontracepted (if no child is wanted). Given the constitutionally
protected status and widespread availability of contraceptives, marriage
is no longer needed to serve the state interest that both states and
BLAG continue to assert21 as the basis for a preference for heterosexual
marriage: to provide an institutional framework that encourages hetero-
sexuals to engage in responsible sex-that is, sex which leads to children
with the healthiest life prospects. Therefore, the way to responsibly
corral heterosexual sex is not by channeling such sex into marriage, but
by insisting on the use of birth control.
States' and BLAG's continued insistence that marriage is the best way
to corral heterosexual sex, despite the obvious reality that this function of
marriage is no longer necessary, is unduly cruel. The sticks once used to
compel the identification of moral or responsible heterosexual sex with sex
within marriage-the criminalization of adultery and fornication; the
20 For example, we continue to stigmatize infidelity, defined as sexual activity that violates
the mutual promises of sexual partners. Additionally, anti-prostitution laws are typically premised
on the idea that even when prostitutes willingly enter into the sex trade, they endure violence that
society should not tolerate. See, e.g., Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 349-51 (2oo6) (discussing competing
feminist views on prostitution).
21 See, e.g., Windsor, 699 F. 3d at 187-88 (reviewing and rejecting BLAG's contention that
DOMA "facilitates the optimal parenting arrangement of a mother and a father").
[Vol. 161: 179
The Incoherence of Marital Benefits
financial and legal disadvantage of illegitimate children; the stigmatization
of unwed mothers; and the refusal, beginning in the mid-1990s, to extend
the full advantage of state and federal benefits to single parentS22-all now
seem anachronistic and voyeuristic at best and sadistic, rather than func-
tional, at worst. If the purpose of all of this state regulation of family,
parenthood, and sexuality is to deter childbirth outside of marriage in order
to avoid the high costs of unplanned children and unwanted or unstable
families, then the obvious and more effective way to prevent all of that
irresponsible procreation is by encouraging the use of birth control. Like-
wise, most of us now recognize that there is no longer any good reason
(although there may be plenty of bad ones) to continue to police extramarital
sex, to stigmatize unwed mothers, or to penalize illegitimate children.
Again, to continue to do so is simply cruel.
This shift in understanding is now squarely reflected in our cultural
conversations about marriage, sex, and children. Increasingly, we try to
instill in our children not so much a moral aversion to "sex outside mar-
riage," but rather, a moral aversion to "irresponsible sex," understood as sex
that is either not fully consensual, not mutually desired, or injures third
parties or the participants themselves, as well as sex that is uncontracepted,
assuming no pregnancy is desired.
Sex, then, has not become demoralized, the fears of social conservatives
notwithstanding. The moral code around sex has not disappeared. It has
simply changed, and radically so. Marriage is no longer viewed, by many, as
the moral precondition of sex. This is largely because marriage is no longer
the only-or even the most optimal-way to ensure that children do not
unintentionally and irresponsibly result from sex outside of marriage. In a
post-birth control and post-IVF world-in which the causal link between
heterosexual sex and the reckless conception of children is broken-it is not
one's marital status, but rather consent, desire, the absence of other harms,
and responsible contraception that have become the moral preconditions of
responsible sex. And we are all the better for it.
In fact, with respect to our current moral code regarding sex, marriage
is simply irrelevant. Sex outside of marriage, as well as sex within it, is
subject to the same moral constraints. With the advent of birth control,
legal abortion, IVF, surrogacy, and same-sex couple adoptions, the once
strong connection between heterosexual activity and procreation has been
severed. In its wake, the moral connection between marriage and respon-
sible sex has been severed as well. Moral sex-inside or outside of
22 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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marriage-is consensual, desired, harmless to others, and contracepted.
What's marriage got to do with it? Nothing.
Where, then, does this leave the quest for a rational justification for
the federal government's refusal to bless same-sex marriages with the
largesse of federal benefits? On obviously shaky footing. To the degree
that the protection and promotion of child welfare was once the point of
civil marriage-and again, I believe there was a time when it clearly was-
that purpose has been undercut not by gay marriage, but by birth control,
and long before the idea of gay marriage ever entered the picture. If the
point of marriage is no longer to channel heterosexual sex into responsible
institutions in order to protect the lives of children whose conception,
without contraceptives, would have been inevitable, then there is hardly
any harm done by diluting this purpose, which has long since been swept
into the dustbin of history.
There is, then, no longer any legitimate reason to exclude same-sex
couples from the federally bestowed benefits that accrue to marriage.
Married parents who adopt, as well as same-sex married couples who avail
themselves of surrogacy arrangements through the use of IVF, are as
capable of forming and supporting healthy families from which children
benefit as are heterosexuals who marry and produce children through
sexual conception. The intact family, and the stable relationship from
which children benefit, is not the marriage defined by heterosexual sexual
activity. It is the family defined by long-term commitment and the
dedication to raising and caring for children.
II. THE CASE AGAINST CIVIL MARRIAGE:
WHAT'S SEX GOT To Do WITH IT?
The harder, and more troubling, issue that should now be pressing upon
us is not the one currently in front of the Supreme Court, regarding the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the financial benefits of marriage.
Rather, we ought to confront the lack of any clear rationale for excluding
anyone who is parenting-or indeed, anyone caring for dependents-from
such benefits. We should be asking, in other words, not only why we are
excluding same-sex married partners from the federal benefits of marriage,
but also, why we are refusing to grant these benefits to any others. Why
should the federal government bestow financial benefits on any married
partners-either same- or opposite-sex- that are not equally bestowed on
unmarried persons, who may, after all, also be parenting? If we have turned
our back on the utility of marriage as a way to safeguard the children that
[Vol. 161: 179
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result from heterosexual sex, what other reason might there be for singling
out married people for the receipt of unique federal benefits?
The remaining justifications for favoring marriage over other living
arrangements offer no basis for distinguishing between same- and opposite-
sex marriages. Children do seem to fare better in families led by married
partners, but this is equally true for children of same-sex partners as for
those of heterosexual partners. 23 If we want to encourage people who wish
to parent to enter into this optimal relationship for parenting, then we
might want to favor marriages (of either sort) over other relationships. But
if the purpose of civil marriage is now the improved life prospects of
children in intact families, then "marriage" is both over- and under-inclusive:
plenty of married persons have no desire or intention to parent, and plenty
of unmarried couples and single people do. If the policy is to be true to the
facts on the ground, we need a reason to favor not only those married
people who parent or wish to parent, but to favor marriage per se. Why
favor married partners over either unmarried partners or single people who
also wish to establish intact families? And, more crucially, why favor
married partners who express no intention whatsoever to parent over
unmarried partners or single people who do possess such desires?
The only remaining justification, or "point" of doing so, in my view, is
that the institution of state-governed and state- recognized marriage operates
fairly well as a semi-privatized social welfare net, which ultimately relieves
the state of some of its burden of caring for the weak, sick, unemployed,
or otherwise vulnerable. Married partners do seem to fare better than
unmarried partners at navigating the vagaries, valleys, pitfalls, and veils of
23 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 124-40 (summarizing the advantages that
children of married parents have over those children whose parents are not married); William
Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and Americas Children, 15
FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 104 (2005) (arguing that available data does not support the contention
that opposite-sex marriage is better than same-sex marriage at furthering the interests of
children); see also Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and
Children's Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 71, 75-76 (2001) (concluding that
children with married parents fare better than those with divorced parents in terms of academic
success, conduct, emotional and psychological adjustment, self-concept, and social relations);
Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-
Analysis, 15 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 355, 366 (2001) (concluding that the welfare gap between
children of married parents and children of divorced parents has widened over time); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing of Children?, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 879 (2005) (concluding that "a rich literature on cohabiting and
marital relationships suggests that marriage provides a substrate of relationship characteristics
among the adults that inure to the benefit of their children").
2013] 187
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tears that life presents.24 An important body of research demonstrates that
married partners better absorb catastrophic losses-such as the loss of a job
or the onset of a serious illness-than their nonmarried peers. 25 As the
argument goes, they live more cheaply simply by virtue of economies of
scale, and, by virtue of their long-term commitments, they undertake long-
term projects and apparently plan more wisely for the future. Their lives, in
short, are more stable -financially as well as emotionally-and for both
reasons, they are presumably happier. Each of them individually, moreover,
is less likely to require state assistance to feed, house, educate, or clothe
their children or themselves. In short, married people are less of a strain on
state coffers. So long as the cost of giving married people additional benefits
is less than the savings generated by virtue of their relative financial
wellbeing, the state's provision of such benefits is a win all around. Mar-
riage, on this understanding, is not the institution that morally and finan-
cially corrals irresponsible sex. It is, rather, a semi-privatized social welfare
net that corrals and privatizes caregiving. According to this argument,
spouses can care for each other better and more cheaply than the state can
care for either of them. Furthermore, marriage is a privatized social welfare
net that actually works: it benefits the parties that enjoy it, and saves the
state considerable costs in the process.
Clearly-and again, assuming this is the best justification for the outflow
of state and federal benefits to married couples but not to single individuals
who also might join or form households for the purpose of bestowing care
on each other-there is no reason whatsoever for reserving these benefits to
opposite-sex married couples rather than all married couples. These couples
are not just similarly situated with respect to this understanding of the
purpose of marriage-they are identically situated. The exclusion of same-
sex married couples from federal benefits is simply absurd, if the point of
marriage is to help couples internalize the costs of their own care, thus
alleviating the state of the burden of caring for those participating in the
24 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 32-33 ("Hundreds of studies demonstrate
that those who feel they have someone they can rely on to help out in times of trouble have better
mental health and greater well-being." (citing J.S. House et al., Structures and Processes of Social
Support, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 293 (1988))); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY
483, 483-507 (1995) (concluding that married people, on average, have longer lifespans, greater
happiness, greater wealth, and less alcoholism than single or cohabiting individuals).
25 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 31 ("Married people are better off because
they have someone who will take care of them when disaster strikes. A spouse acts as a sort of
small insurance pool against life's uncertainties, reducing the need to protect oneself from
unexpected events by oneself alone.").
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marriage. If this is, in fact, the underlying point of civil marriage, the
constitutional question raised by Windsor answers itself.
And that is a reasonable and constitutionally sound resting spot, save for
one complication. If this is the point of "marriage," there is also no convinc-
ing reason to limit the understanding of who is and isn't married, and who
is and isn't entitled to the federal and state benefits that flow from that
status, to couples who join together sexually and perform a ritual for the
purpose of setting up households of mutual care and provision. If the point
of the institution-and the point of privileging it economically-is the
superiority of care that such parties bestow on each other, there is no reason
to limit either the appellation or the entitlements to couples who have a
sexual connection. What, after all, has sex got to do with it?
Rather, it would seem that any two-or more-people who form a
household and provide for each other, and perhaps for others, the
requisite care, services, and mutual help that render the married house-
hold optimal for dependents are equally worthy of federal largesse. A
grandmother and mother who live together and raise the mother's small
children, siblings who live together and provide care and support for
aging parents, friends who come together to provide care and nurturance
for each other, and surely a single man or woman raising children on his
or her own-all of these groupings constitute caregiving arrangements
that internalize, or privatize, the provision of care, thereby lifting the
burden from the state. As a result, all should presumably be entitled to
state and federal recognition. If the point of civil marriage is its efficacy
as a privatized social welfare net, then perhaps all of these units could
and should be understood as marriages, and should be rewarded with
federal benefits accordingly.
I do not mean this suggestion as a reductio ad absurdum. The state's
interest in marriage, today, is surely more rooted in the social utility of
private parties' mutual promises of long-term care, nurture, and love than
in recognizing the legitimacy, responsibility, or nature of their sexual
activities. If so-and if that state interest is rational-then presumably the
state's solicitous attitude toward married partners ought to extend to all
citizens who come together with long-term commitments to each other to
engage in this vital and loving work. All such persons provide care that is
of tremendous value to those who receive it, and which, in turn, saves the
state significant resources. If we reward married couples for this way of
life because we acknowledge that the care typically bestowed by married
partners on each other is socially worthwhile (not just to them but to all of
us), then shouldn't we also recognize other forms of caregiving commit-
ment, regardless of the caregivers' sexual relationship or lack thereof?
2013] 189
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CONCLUSION
Would it be possible to recognize these other forms of caregiving? What
would such a world look like? It might not be so different from the one we
now inhabit. Rather than the federal pension benefits, social security
benefits, widows' and widowers' exemptions, and health insurance benefits,
with which we now reward people solely for the act of marrying, we could
instead bestow on all persons who provide to particular others a substantial
amount of care a federal "caregiver's benefit," pegged to foregone income,
or, perhaps, to need, or to some other metric that strikes our representative
legislators as fair. Such a benefit would bring our practice more in line with
the best justification we can articulate in a post-birth control world for
bestowing so many privileges on married persons. We currently bestow
these benefits, for the most part, on opposite-sex married partners, regard-
less of their caregiving status, and with no analogous benefit for (though
perhaps not for long) same-sex couples or (with no change in sight) non-
married people similarly situated in every relevant sense.
If caregiving is the reason we do so, it is time we consider bestowing that
largesse on all caregivers, rather than limiting it to one subset of sexually
active partners whom we allow to sign up for the weak proxy of marriage.
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